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A B S T R A C T
Patients with hemianopia can present with the so called blindsight phenomenon: the ability to perform above
chance in the absence of acknowledged awareness. Proper awareness reports are, thus, crucial to distinguish
pure forms of blindsight from forms of conscious, yet degraded, vision. It has, in fact, been recently shown that 1)
dichotomous and graded measures to assess awareness can lead to different behavioural results in patients with
hemianopia and that 2) different grades of perceptual clarity show different electrophysiological correlates in
healthy participants. Here, in hemianopic patients, we assessed awareness by means of the four-point Perceptual
Awareness Scale (PAS) and investigated its neural correlates with Event Related Potentials (ERPs). Results
showed that patients, in most of the cases, can rate the clarity of their perceptual experience in a graded manner.
Moreover, graded perceptual experiences correlated with the amplitude of deflections in ERPs. These results call
for the need to assess perceptual awareness with graded measures and for the importance to use electro-
physiological data to correlate behaviour with neural processing.
1. Introduction
A lesion or disconnection of the primary visual cortex (V1) leads to
the experience of a region of blindness in the corresponding portion of
the visual field (Holmes, 1945). However, some patients, despite de-
nying being able to see the stimuli presented to their impaired visual
field, can accurately detect, localize and discriminate them (Poppel
et al., 1973; Weiskrantz et al., 1974). This phenomenon has been
termed “blindsight” (Weiskrantz et al., 1974), to signal the paradox of
the absence of awareness (“blind”) in the presence of above chance
performance (“sight”). Although this intriguing finding was at first
taken with some scepticism, throughout the years it received robust and
consistent evidence (Weiskrantz, 2009, 1996). Weiskrantz’ insight was
to ask patients to guess about the stimuli (discrimination task) they
were presented within their impaired visual field, and to use a com-
mentary key about their awareness of the stimulus on a trial-by-trial
basis, i.e. the so-called “commentary key paradigm” (Berlucchi, 2017;
Weiskrantz, 1986). By putting together these two self-reports, it was,
thus, possible to contrast accuracy in conditions in which patients re-
ported to have seen the stimuli (aware trials) with those in which pa-
tients reported to have guessed about their presence (unaware trials).
The astonishing finding, that is the core of the blindsight Type I
phenomenon (Celeghin et al., 2017; Weiskrantz, 1998a), was that when
patients reported no awareness of the stimulus on the commentary key,
they were, nevertheless, accurate about it in the discrimination task. In
this respect, it is, thus, evident the crucial importance of patients’ re-
liable reports when using a commentary key paradigm. Indeed, to be
classified as blindsight, above chance behaviour needs to be associated
with a total loss of perceptual awareness. Along the years, however,
some hemianopic patients were found to show some kind of awareness
of the stimuli presented to their impaired visual field. This conscious
experience of the stimuli can mainly be of two kinds (Mazzi et al.,
2016): a non-visual knowledge/feeling that something has occurred in
the impaired visual field (the so-called blindsight Type II; Weiskrantz,
1998a) or a conscious visual experience of the stimulus, although per-
ceived in a degraded form (see Mazzi et al., 2017b for a recent review).
In this respect, also reliability of the commentary key needs to be taken
into account. Indeed, it has been claimed that the original commentary
key paradigm, using only two report levels (aware and unaware),
“might be too crude a distinction” (Weiskrantz, 1998b) and that more
likely “awareness would fall on a continuum than a discrete scale”
(Sahraie et al., 2010). Following this logic, it could, thus, be the case
that “the “unaware” mode may contain some “smidgen” of awareness”
(Weiskrantz, 1998b). If this is true, then, what is sometimes considered
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as a blindsight performance could instead be due to conscious, yet
degraded, vision. Unfortunately, few studies have investigated this
possibility (Mazzi et al., 2016; Overgaard et al., 2008). With respect to
the most recent paper, a hemianopic patient (SL) was requested to
discriminate several different features of stimuli presented in her im-
paired visual field and asked to rate her awareness with both a di-
chotomous and a continuous scale. Noteworthy, the patient showed
blindsight performance on the dichotomous scale, which disappeared
when using a graded scale, the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS;
Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004): her behaviour was therefore better
explained as degraded conscious vision. The authors, in agreement with
Weiskrantz’ proposal, interpreted this discrepancy by suggesting that
patients, when using a dichotomous scale, may be reluctant to ac-
knowledge awareness for the kind of experience they have in their
impaired visual field and they may, thus, produce false negative re-
sponses (i.e. stating that they did not see a stimulus). Conversely, a
more graded scale would allow the patients to be less conservative in
assessing awareness of the stimuli and, thus, produce more “aware”
responses.
Together with behavioural responses, another very informative
approach in the field of awareness is to look for the neural activity
correlating with the presence/absence of conscious experience. In this
respect, electroencephalography (EEG) and more specifically event-re-
lated potentials (ERPs), thanks to their high temporal resolution, seem
to be the best candidates for this purpose.
In literature, two components have been found to correlate with
visual awareness: the Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN) and the Late
Positivity (LP) (Koivisto et al., 2016; Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003; Pitts
et al., 2014; Railo et al., 2015), thought to reflect, respectively, the
phenomenal content, i.e. the actual content of the perceptual experi-
ence, and access properties of perceptual awareness, i.e. the ability to
report, remember or act on such perceptual experiences (Block, 2005).
The VAN is a negative difference wave between “aware” and “unaware”
trials, peaks at about 200 ms after stimulus onset and has a maximal
amplitude at occipito-temporal electrodes contralateral to stimulus
presentation (Koivisto et al., 2008a). The LP is another, positive, dif-
ference wave between “aware” and “unaware” trials with a latency
between 300 and 400 ms after stimulus onset, mainly observed at
centro-parietal sites (Del Cul et al., 2007). Interestingly, both these
difference waves were found to be modulated by the clarity of con-
scious experience as measured with the PAS (Tagliabue et al., 2016):
their amplitude increased as the quality of conscious experience of
healthy participants increased. Putting together all these pieces of
evidence, it would thus be of extreme interest to investigate whether
similar results can be obtained in hemianopic patients when presented
with stimuli in their impaired visual field. To do so, in the present
paper, we asked four patients with visual field defects to discriminate
the contrast of visual stimuli briefly presented within their impaired
visual field. A graded scale, the PAS, was used as a commentary key in
order to allow the patients to rate their phenomenal experience on
different levels of awareness. Importantly, we also investigated whether
these levels of awareness correlated with ERP difference waves, thought
to reflect phenomenal (as detected by the VAN) and access (as detected
by the LP) properties of awareness.
2. Method
2.1. Patients
Patient AM: A right-handed male patient, 66 years old, suffered from
a bilateral altitudinal hemianopia on the upper part of his visual field
(Fig. 1B) resulting from an ischemic stroke. MRI evidenced a bilateral
lesion of the lingual gyrus extending to the lower bank of the primary
visual cortex in the right hemisphere (Fig. 1A). For further details, see
Mazzi et al. (2017a). The patient was tested 4 and half years after his
neurological event.
Patient FB: A right-handed female patient, 50 years old, suffered
from a left superior quadrantanopia (Fig. 1B) resulting from a hae-
morrhagic stroke. MRI evidenced a widespread lesion of the right
temporal, parietal and occipital lobe involving the superior occipital
gyrus and part of the middle occipital gyrus (Fig. 1A). For further de-
tails, see the paper by Sanchez-Lopez et al. (2017). The patient was
tested 2 years after her neurological event.
Patient LF: A right-handed female patient, 51 years old, suffered
from a left superior quadrantanopia (Fig. 1B) resulting from an is-
chemic stroke. MRI evidenced a lesion of the anterior portion of the
right calcarine fissure up to the origin of the parieto-occipital fissure
(Fig. 1A). For further details, see Bollini et al. (2017). The patient was
tested 4 years after her neurological event.
Patient SL: A right-handed female patient, 49 years old, suffered
from a right homonymous hemianopia (Fig. 1B) resulting from an is-
chemic stroke with haemorrhagic evolution. MRI evidenced a complete
destruction of her left V1, including the lingual gyrus and the calcarine
fissure (Fig. 1A). For further details, see Bagattini et al. (2015) and
Mazzi et al. (2014). The patient was tested 7 years after her neurolo-
gical event.
The patients gave their written informed consent prior to participate
in the study and were free to withdraw at any time. The study was
approved by the local Ethics Committee and conducted in accordance
with the 2013 Declaration of Helsinki.
2.1.1. Stimuli
The stimuli were unilaterally displayed in the impaired visual field
of each patient for 60 ms and consisted of 2° diameter grey circles, ei-
ther lighter or darker than the grey background, which had a luminance
of 6.66 cd/m2. The two stimulus luminance values were chosen on the
basis of a previous detection threshold session (AM: darker: 4.75 cd/m2,
lighter: 8.42 cd/m2; FB: darker: 6.52 cd/m2, lighter: 7.61 cd/m2; LF:
darker: 1.09 cd/m2, lighter: 14.13 cd/m2; SL: darker: 0.41 cd/m2,
lighter: 9.65 cd/m2), see Tagliabue et al. (2016) for more details. The
eccentricity of the stimuli located in the impaired field was tailored to
the patients’ visual field defects, according to their latest perimetry
(AM: 2° above and 10° to the right of fixation; FB: 6° above and 4° to the
left of fixation; LF: 8° above and 11° to the left of fixation; SL: 7° above
and 12° to the right of fixation). Catch trials, in which no stimulus was
presented, were also included in the experiment (10%) to monitor pa-
tients’ false alarm rate.
2.1.2. Experimental procedure
The patients sat in a dimly lit testing room in front of a 17-inc CRT
monitor (resolution 1024 × 768, refresh rate of 85 Hz) placed at a
viewing distance of 57 cm, with their head laying on an adjustable chin
rest. On-line monitoring of patients’ eye movements was performed by
an infrared camera to verify that they maintained fixation during the
stimulus presentation. The trial sequence is depicted in Fig. 1C, see
Tagliabue et al. (2016) for more details.
Throughout the EEG recording session, hemianopic patients were
requested to provide two off-line responses afterwards a fixed period
following stimulus presentation: (1) a 2-alternative forced-choice
(2AFC) response on stimulus contrast discrimination, by pressing a key
for “lighter” and another key for “darker” than the background. The
patients were asked to guess when no stimulus discrimination was
possible (i.e. for catch trials or unseen stimuli). (2) A commentary key
to rate the quality of their perception on the four-point Perceptual
Awareness Scale (PAS; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004): 0) no experience
of the stimulus, 1) a brief glimpse, meaning that the participant saw
something but could not discriminate the brightness of the stimulus
(lighter or darker than the background), 2) an almost clear experience
and 3) a clear experience. See Tagliabue et al. (2016) for a more de-
tailed procedure to ascertain patients’ understanding of the scale.
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The EEG experimental session was divided into 30 blocks of 33 trials
each (15 lighter, 15 darker and 3 stimulus-absent trials), thus yielding a
total of 990 trials. The order of the trials was fully randomized. The EEG
experiment was programmed and run using E-prime (Psychology
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA; https://www.pstnet.com/
eprime.cfm).
Fig. 1. A) Anatomical reconstruction of patients’ brain lesions (according to neurological convention, i.e. where left hemisphere is on the left side of the image). B) Visual field defect of
each patient. C) Single trial structure of the experimental procedure: A fixation cross was presented for 400 ms followed by a warning acoustic tone lasting 150 ms. Then, a random
interval preceded stimulus presentation (60 ms) in the impaired visual field of patients. After a 1000 ms pause the patients had to discriminate the brightness of the stimulus
(Discrimination task) and then rate the clarity of their perception on the PAS (Awareness task).
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2.1.3. EEG recording and event-related brain potential (ERP) analysis
EEG signal was continuously recorded with BrainAmp system (Brain
Products GmbH, Munich, Germany – BrainVision Recorder) using a
Fast'n Easy cap with 59 Ag/AgCl pellet pin electrodes (EasyCap GmbH,
Herrsching, Germany) placed according to the 10–10 International
System (O1, Oz, O2, PO7, PO3, POz, PO4, PO8, P7, P5, P3, P1, Pz, P2,
P4, P6, P8, TP7, CP5, CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP4, CP6, TP8, T7, C5, C3,
C1, Cz, C2, C4, C6, T8, FT7, FC5, FC3, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC4, FC6, FT8,
F7, F5, F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4, F6, F8, AF7, AF3, AF4, AF8, FP1, FP2). Four
additional electrodes were used for monitoring blinks and eye move-
ments. Horizontal and vertical eye movements were detected respec-
tively with electrodes placed at the left and right canthi and above and
below the right eye. Other two extra electrodes served as ground (AFz)
and online reference (right mastoid, RM). Electrode impedances were
kept below 5 kΩ. The digitization rate was 1000 Hz with a time con-
stant of 10 s as low cut-off and a high cut-off of 250 Hz. The EEG signal
was processed off-line using EEGLAB toolbox version 14 (Delorme and
Makeig, 2004) implemented in MATLAB (MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA,
USA). Prior to the analysis, continuous raw data were downsampled to
250 Hz and high-pass filtered at 1 Hz. EEG was then re-referenced
offline to the average of all scalp electrodes. Moreover, sinusoidal noise
(50 − 100 Hz) due to power line was removed by means of the EEGLAB
plugin CleanLine prior to data segmentation into 2-second epochs (1 s
pre-stimulus). Trials affected by high amplitude artefacts were dis-
carded based on visual inspection with the purpose of facilitating In-
dependent Component Analysis (ICA) convergence. ICA was then per-
formed by using the runica algorithm (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) to
reject artefactual ICs related to eye blinks, saccades or muscle activity.
Consequently, a low-pass filter of 40 Hz was applied. The epoch
window was shortened to 1300 ms, starting 300 ms before the onset of
the stimulus, and thereafter baseline corrected on this pre-stimulus
period. Before averaging per PAS condition, all segments were visually
inspected a second time and rejected when contaminated by any re-
sidual eye movements, blinks, strong muscle activity or excessively
noisy EEG.
Electrophysiological data from patient FB could not be taken into
consideration for analysis due to the huge number of blinks during
stimulus presentation (> 90% of trials). The presence of such a high
number of artefacts drastically reduced the clean segments to be con-
sidered for averaging, thus resulting not to be enough for reliable ERPs.
Therefore, statistical analyses were performed on three patients (AM,
LF, and SL).
Due to the fact that the three patients included in the EEG analysis
(AM, LF and SL) almost never used rating 3 on the PAS (i.e. clearly seen
stimuli), the averaging was carried out for three different conditions
only: PAS = 0 (correct lighter and darker trials classified as 0 on the
PAS scale), PAS = 1 (correct lighter and darker trials classified as 1 on
the PAS scale), PAS = 2 (correct lighter and darker trials classified as 2
on the PAS scale). Following EEG pre-processing, the number of trials
used for the average was 27, 97 and 139 for PAS = 0, 248, 242 and 253
for PAS = 1, 109, 30 and 57 for PAS = 2, respectively for patients AM,
LF and SL.
2.1.4. Statistical analysis
To determine whether patient's accuracy was significantly different
from chance (50%), a non-parametric binomial test was performed for
each level of the PAS. Moreover, a trend analysis across the different
PAS levels was performed to determine whether an increase in the level
of perceptual clarity was related to an increase of accuracy.
To run group level statistical analyses aiming to investigate possible
electrophysiological differences between PAS ratings, the EEG signal
was swapped between right and left hemisphere electrodes in patients
AM and LF, as stimulus presentation was lateralized on the basis of the
visual field defect of each patient. With this new data arrangement,
electrodes placed over the left hemisphere always corresponded to
those contralateral to the visual stimulus.
EEGLAB non-parametric permutation statistics (with 2000 permu-
tations) were performed to assess statistical differences between PAS
conditions. False discovery rate (FDR) correction was always applied to
account for comparison from multiple electrode sites (significance level
set at p<0.05 after FDR correction). Specifically, the three conditions
(PAS = 0, 1 and 2) were first compared and, subsequently, the unaware
condition (PAS = 0) was separately pairwise compared with both PAS
= 1 and PAS = 2.
The time windows chosen for the analyses (a 20 ms window from
198 ms to 218 ms for the VAN and a 400 ms window from 416 ms to
816 ms for the LP) were selected in line with previous literature
(Koivisto et al., 2008b; Tagliabue et al., 2016) and by visually in-
specting the peak latency of both the components of interest (VAN:
greatest negative peak at 208 ms in electrode CP5; LP: greatest positive
peak at 616 ms in electrode Pz).
3. Results
3.1. Behavioural results
All patients could use the different levels of the PAS, indicating that
they could actually grade their own perceptual experiences along this
awareness scale. Patients LF and SL never used PAS = 3, while FB never
used PAS = 1 but used PAS = 3 a few times (12%). AM used all the
levels of the PAS, with PAS = 3 used very few times (1%). Taken to-
gether, the mean percentage of responses for the different PAS levels
were as follows: PAS = 0: 22%; PAS = 1: 43%; PAS = 2: 32% and PAS
= 3: 3% as depicted in Fig. 2A. By inspecting the percentage of re-
sponses given by each patient at the different levels of the PAS
(Fig. 2C), it seems reasonable to assert that all patients could rate their
phenomenal experience in their “blind” field along different levels of
clarity. However, FB seemed to use the scale in a different manner than
the other three patients, i.e. she never used PAS = 1 and instead shifted
to PAS = 2 to indicate her first level of conscious perceptual clarity of
the stimuli. This hypothesis could be corroborated by the evidence that
for all patients, the great majority of responses are reported for the
second (used) level of the PAS (PAS = 1 for AM, LF and SL and PAS = 2
for FB), thus indicating some level of conscious experience for a sti-
mulus not clearly perceived.
Binomial tests showed that patients’ accuracy was not different from
chance level for PAS = 0 and PAS = 1 (both ps> 0.05), whereas for
PAS = 2 and PAS = 3 accuracy was above 50% (both ps< 0.001).
Moreover, a trend analysis showed that patients’ performance linearly
increased as the perceived clarity of the stimulus increased (R2 = 0.90.
F(1,3) = 231.047; p<0.001) (see Fig. 2B). These results indicate that,
in the present group of patients, we could not find any sign of blindsight
Type I (i.e. above chance accuracy when using PAS = 0) and that, to
reliably report the contrast of the stimuli, the quality of perception
needs to be at least almost clear (PAS = 2 or 3), while a brief glimpse is
not enough, in line with previous research (Mazzi et al., 2016).
Importantly, all patients could accurately detect when nothing was
presented, as they responded 0 (no experience of the stimulus) on the
PAS in almost all the catch trials (AM: 98%; FB: 100%; LF: 98%; SL:
96%), i.e. when the stimulus was actually absent.
3.2. ERPs results
3.2.1. Visual awareness negativity
Fig. 3A shows the topographic scalp distribution of the VAN across
PAS conditions in the time window from 198 ms to 218 ms after sti-
mulus presentation. The comparison of ERPs in this time window be-
tween the three PAS ratings found a significant difference over a cluster
of three left centro-parietal electrodes (P7, P3 and CP3, p<0.05, one-
way repeated-measures ANOVA with 2000 permutations and FDR
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correction), as depicted in Fig. 3A.
Moreover, the pairwise comparison between PAS = 0 and PAS = 1
revealed a significant difference over a cluster of electrodes comprising
P3, CP1, CP3, CP5, C3 and T8 (again mostly distributed over lateral
centro-parietal sites, p<0.05, paired t-test based on permutation
analysis and FDR correction). The same analysis comparing PAS = 0
versus PAS = 2 showed a significant difference at electrodes P3, P5, P7,
CP3, CP5 and C3 (p<0.05).
3.2.2. Late positivity
Fig. 3B shows electrical potential maps of the LP mean amplitude
across PAS conditions in the time window from 416 ms to 816 ms after
stimulus presentation. When considering the comparison between the
three PAS levels, no significant differences were observed (see right
map of Fig. 3B). Given the small size of our sample (n=3), we decided
to perform the pairwise comparisons as well, even though the multi-
level analysis did not highlight any differences between conditions,
following the logic that this lack of significance might be due to a false
negative result. When comparing PAS = 0 with PAS = 1, a significant
difference was evident at electrodes PO7, O1, Oz, O2, PO8, C1 and F8,
while the comparison between PAS = 0 and PAS = 2 revealed a sig-
nificant cluster of electrodes including P7, P3, FC1, O2, CP6, C6, FC6,
F6, FP2, FT8 (all ps< 0.05, paired t-test based on permutation analysis
and FDR correction). In both cases, the significant clusters were not
totally coherent with the typical centro-parietal topography of LP.
4. Discussion
In the present paper, we tested the ability of hemianopic patients to
rate the quality of their conscious experience along a graded scale and
investigated whether these ratings correlated with specific ERP de-
flections. Four hemianopic patients took part in the experiment. They
were presented with visual stimuli in their “blind” visual field and re-
quested to provide first a 2AFC response on the stimulus feature (i.e.
contrast) and then to rate the quality of their perception along a 4-level
scale (the PAS, Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). At behavioural level, all
the patients could, in a portion of trials, report the presence of a visual
stimulus and reliably rate their conscious experiences along the levels
Fig. 2. Behavioural results A) Mean proportion of PAS responses
as a function of PAS level. B) Mean percentage of correct re-
sponses for all PAS ratings. C) Single patients’ percentage of re-
sponses at the different levels of the PAS. D) Single patients’
percentage of correct responses as a function of PAS level.
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of the scale. Interestingly, all patients but one (FB) used consecutive
levels of the PAS, thus showing a graded experience with different le-
vels of clarity in line with those described by the PAS. Patient FB, in-
stead, did not use the intermediate level of the PAS describing her ex-
perience as a brief glimpse (PAS = 1), but she rather rated her first
level of conscious experience as an almost clear stimulus. Importantly,
thus, all patients could use the different levels of the PAS, but not all
patients used the scale in the same manner. These findings reinforce the
idea that a graded scale could, better than a dichotomous one, reflect
the subjective experience patients report for stimuli presented to their
“blind” field. On the other hand, though, these findings highlight that a
graded scale appears to be a more difficult rating tool when applied to
patients and that not all of them use it in the same way. As a con-
sequence, then, when using these kinds of scales, researchers need to
also take into account the patient's ability to correctly label different
levels/grades of their phenomenal experience in a proper way.
At electrophysiological level, three patients (AM, LF and SL) were
analysed. Results showed the presence of both components (VAN and
LP) found to be associated to conscious experience (Koivisto and
Revonsuo, 2003; Tagliabue et al., 2016). Interestingly, the VAN, the
Fig. 3. ERP results. The three maps on the top left of each panel represent the topographic scalp distribution of VAN and LP (µV) across PAS conditions (PAS = 0, PAS = 1, PAS = 2). The
map on the right indicates the regions of significant difference when comparing all the PAS ratings (p<0.05, repeated-measures one-way ANOVA with 2000 permutations and FDR
correction). Maps on the bottom of each panel show electrodes with significant differences, respectively between PAS = 0 and PAS =1 (left) and PAS = 0 and PAS =2 (right) (p<0.05,
paired t-tests with 2000 permutations and FDR correction). A) VAN (20 ms time window: from 198 to 218 ms). B) LP (400 ms time window: from 416 to 816 ms).
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early negative component thought to reflect the actual content of
conscious experience, was modulated by the levels of the PAS: i.e. in-
creasing in amplitude as the clarity of the patients’ perception in-
creased. The importance of this evidence relates to the fact that, like in
healthy participants (Tagliabue et al., 2016), it is possible to find an
early neural correlate in temporal and centro-parietal electrodes, con-
tralateral to stimulus presentation, correlating with different qualia
elicited by the same external visual stimulus. Moreover, in addition to
what can be found in healthy participants, the finding of the present
study is even more interesting as it establishes the possibility to find
neural correlates for conscious vision within the “blind” field of hemi-
anopic patients. The use of a continuous scale, thus, can provide more
evidence on the different grades of perceptual conscious experience and
ensure that patient's performance reflects a pure form of blindsight
(when patients report no awareness of the stimuli but their performance
is above chance), and not some sort of degraded vision (Mazzi et al.,
2016) in which their performance correlates with the clarity of their
perception.
Conversely, the LP, the late positive component thought to reflect
post-perceptual processes (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010), although
detectable at all PAS levels, was not modulated by awareness ratings
over those cortical areas reported in the literature: i.e. it did not sig-
nificantly increase in amplitude as the clarity of the patients’ perceptual
experience increased. One possible explanation for the absence of this
effect could be that patients, when responding to the PAS, did not have
enough perceptual evidence to elicit specific distinct levels of conscious
access, due to their abnormal visual experience following cortical da-
mage. Given that the three patients included in the analyses almost
never used the level 3 of the PAS (i.e. a clear experience), the phe-
nomenal properties of the stimulus appeared overall too poorly dis-
tinguishable when an explicit descriptive report through the different
levels of the PAS was required. According to this possible explanation,
patients’ performance in accurately reporting the stimulus feature was
at chance level for two (PAS = 0 and PAS = 1) out of three levels of the
PAS. It might, thus, be possible that the actual features of the stimulus
cannot be completely accessed to and, as a consequence, the LP com-
ponent cannot be modulated by the different levels of clarity in giving a
specific response. This hypothesis seems to be in line with the for-
mulation of the role of the VAN and LP components recently proposed
by Koivisto and colleagues (Koivisto et al., 2016): awareness seems to
emerge at the N200 time window (i.e. at the VAN time window) while
the accumulation of evidence needed for the subject to make a decision
and select a response emerges at the P300 time window (i.e. at the LP
time window). Within this theoretical framework, weak but different
phenomenal contents of awareness can emerge and be detected by the
VAN component, while, at the same time, the amount of evidence ac-
cumulated with these different phenomenal contents may not be dis-
tinct enough to show a modulation of the LP with respect to the PAS
levels used. A note of caution, however, needs to be reported. Indeed,
the lack of the LP modulation could simply reflect a false negative effect
due to low statistical power in analysing ERPs from only three patients.
To solve this problem, more patients need to be studied in future re-
search. Moreover, an important investigation, trying to correlate LP
modulation with accuracy (and, thus, post-perceptual processes like the
certainty in giving a specific response about stimulus features), should
focus on patients showing blindsight. This would, indeed, be essential
to relate the presence/absence of access to perceptual awareness (as
reflected by the LP component) and above chance accuracy.
Another important implication for the present results stands on the
neural correlates of perceptual awareness in the “blind” field. It is, in-
deed, important to understand what neural structures and mechanisms
subserve conscious vision in the absence of direct visual input, as this
would provide more information on which areas are necessary for vi-
sual awareness. The present findings seem to advocate for a role of the
extrastriate cortex in mediating conscious vision in the absence of a
functioning primary visual cortex (V1). Indeed, the three patients
included into the ERP analysis (AM, LF and SL) suffered from a partial
(AM and LF) or complete (SL) lesion of V1. However, these patients can
consciously report visual stimuli presented in the corresponding “blind”
portion of their visual field and, more importantly, the quality of their
phenomenal experience (as measured with the PAS) correlates with
activity at temporal and centro-parietal electrodes of the damaged
hemisphere. These findings reinforce the idea that the role of V1 in
conscious vision needs to be redefined (Silvanto, 2015, 2014, 2008;
Silvanto et al., 2008). Indeed, several pieces of evidence (see the review
by Mazzi et al., 2017b) seem to show that, although V1 is important for
normal conscious vision, at least in creating the conditions for aware-
ness to arise, it is not always essential for it: awareness can in fact arise
also in the absence of a functioning V1.
In conclusion, the results of the present paper, in accord with
Weiskrantz’ legacy, highlight the importance of commentary keys and
the use of self-reports in characterizing the phenomenal contents
hemianopic patients experience in their “blind” field. Moreover, these
data establish the importance of adding electrophysiological measures
to correlate these perceptual experiences with neural activity.
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